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The model Everaert persents is an extension of  Next, Everacrt shows in detail how this
the simple RMSM-X model developed to  theoretical framework is implemented in the
improve the Country Operations Division's  RMSM-X model by specifying demand and
macroeconomic monitoring and modeling  supply sides of all markets. An econometrically
capabilities. Adding econometrically estimated  estimated short-run price equation plays a key
behavioral equations and the use of lagged  role.
relationships makes the model fit for short-run
simulations while maintaining an essentially  Everacrti's simulation results show that even
recursive structure and thus keeping computa-  if a credible program is implemented, at least
tional costs at a minimum.  two years of negative per capita growth are
needed to bring inflation down from its current
First, Everaert reviews the theoretic-:  levels to below 10 percent a year.  The accompa-
framework of an inflation stabilization program.  nying fiscal effort is great: the equivalent of a 40
In the absence of price rigidities, a reduction in  percent increase in direct tax revenues if no other
inflation simply implies finding a replacement  expenditure or revenue measures are taken.
for revenue lost from a decline in the inflation  Scenarios that do not incorporate strong fiscal
rate. In reality, backward-looking nominal  action do not succeed in permanently lowering
contracts and credibility problems induce short-  inflation and Icad to lower per capita GDP at the
run costs, making a fall in the economic growth  end of the decade than does the scenario of fiscal
rate an inevitable part of inflation stabilization.  stabilization.  Inflation in the Turkish context is
The theoretical framework yields the specifica-  costly because it reduces not only the level of
tion of a few key behavioral equations to be  productive investment but also its efficiency.
implemented in the model.
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I am particularly indebted to  Michael Lewin, Jaume Ventura, Paulo Vieira da
Cunha and Steve Webb  for their assistance  and helpful  discussion and to Rudi
Dornbush,  William McCleary  and Roberto  Rocha  for their valuable  comments.The World Bank has recently upgraded  its &lQvised  Minimum  Standard  Model, from an
set of projection rules for the balance of payments  and the national accounts, to a RMSM-X
(eXtended),  which attempts  to model the Interaction  of the different  sectors of an economy  in a
consistent  manner. This macro-model  is mainly used for medium-term  projections  required  to
guide the Bank's operational  decisions. The model focuses on .he budget constraints  of the
different sectors, especially on the fiscal accounts and the foreign sector (the balance of
payments)  as they are  key determinants  of the macroeconomic  balances. The RMSM-X  model
contains  few estimated  relations  s.rice for most countries  good time series data is unavailable
and frequent shifts In policy-regimes  make most estimated  parameters  unstable.
The purpose  of .;  ,s paper is to show how, by making  creative  use of lagged economic
relMtionships  and adaptive  price  setting  mechanisms  (ie.  backward  looking  contracts),  the RMSM-
X model can be used for short-term  policy si,nulations. In particular,  attention is paid to the
short-run  output  costs of inflation  stabilization  as a result  of price rigidities.  The  recursive  solution
of the model, leading  to quantity  closures  of different  markets  does lower  the confidence  one can
have  in the point forecasts  of the simulation. By testing  the sensitivity  of the simulations  to the
chosen path of the key intermediate  variable  (in this case  the domesiic real Interest  rate), and
by checking whether  the solution enters in the confidence interval  of existing econometrically
estimated  equations,  not incorporated  in the model, this confidence  can be greatly enhanced.
This paper first reviews  the main features  of the basic RMSM-X  model ancd  then applies
the model to the problem  of inflation  stabilization  in the Turkish  context. The second section  of
the paper establishes  the theoretical  framework  for the analysis  of the problem of disinflation.
The  third section  shows  how the RMSM-X  model  can be  adapted  for short-run  policy simulations
by incorporating  some additional  estimated  behavioral  equations. The fourthi  section  the paper
reviews briefly the relevant recent economic developments  in Turkey and then presents a
scenario  of adequate  fiscal adjustment  that leads to a sustainable  reduction  of inflation. This
scenario is compared with a policy of monetary contraction  without fiscal support.  In both
scenarios  attention is paid to price rigidities  which lead to short-run  adjustment  costs in terms
of oLtput lost.  A final section summarizes  the main findings.
1.  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  THE MODEL
The RMSM-X  model starts conceptually  from a flow-of-funds  matrix which contains  the
budget constraints  of all the specified  sectors in tne economy. in this way, no matter how the
variables entering  the budget constraints are projected, consistency  is assured.  In order to2
introduce  meaningful  economic  behavior  in the model, markets  need  to be added  to the budget
constraints  and domand  and supply  behavior  needs  to be specified. Since only a limited set of
variables  can be solved  for endogenously,  the specification  of this set determines  the nawre of
the closure  of the model.
1.1. THE  BUDGET  CONSTRAINTS
The  model  assures  consistency  In the projections  by requiring  that the budget  constraints
for the economic sectors are satisfied at all times.  Six different  sectors are identified in the
Turkey  model: (i) the non-financial  State Economic  Enterprises,  (ii) the rest of the non-financial
public sector,  which is called nbudget", (iii)  the private  non-financial  sector, (iv)  the central bank,
(v) the domestic banking system,  and (vi) the foreign  sector. The symbols used In the budget
constraints  throughout  the paper are explained  In Table 1.1.1Y  Figure 1.1 presents  the budget
constraints  of the six sectors  in flow-of-funds  '-rmat, omitting  the time subscript  for current  end-
of-period  stocks and  for flows  occurring  during  the current  period  to save  notationY Each  budget
constraint  consists  of two statements  of the type:
CURRENT  INCOME  - CURRENT  EXPENDITURE  = SAVING
SAVING  = NET  ACCUMULATION  OF WEALTH
The top half of Figure 1.1  presents  the current  account of all sectors in matrix format while the
bottom half shows  the capital  account. All budget  constraints  are defined  in nominal  terms and
include sufficc  Jetail  in order to  distinguish the most  relevant categories of  income,
expenditure  an  w.hanges  in assets  for each of the sectors.  In both matrices,  rows represent
incoming and columns outgoings. The specification  of the various  entries in the matrices  is
Throughout  the paper we will use the following conventions:
A
SX  - x-x.,;  x-  S6/.,
A superscript  asterisk  indicates  a foreign currency  denominated  variable.
v  For a more detailed description  of the budget constraints  and the flow-of-funds  concept see
Everaert  et. al. (1990).3
TABLE  t.1: DEFINmOI3  OF  VARIABLES  IN BUDGET  CONSTRAINTS
Variables  with an asterisk  are defined  in US$. The rest of the variables  are expressed  in
local currency  at current  prices except  for those variables  marked with (#) which are deflned  in
constant  terms.
B  Bonds
C  Consumption  (#)
CR  Credit  from the Central  Bank
CU  Currency  in circulation
DD  Demand  deposits
E  Average  exchange  rate
F  Net  foreign-currency  denominated  borrowing
FG  External  debt
FX  Foreign  currency deposits  with domestic sectors
Fl  Factor  income
I  Investment  (#)
i,  Nominal  foreign Interest  rate
iD  Nominal  interest  rate on deposits
ic  Nominal interest  rate on credits
jR  Nominal  rate of rediscount
IM  Imports (#)
KT  Capital  transfers
NW  Net worth
OFI  Other factor income
P&L  Distributed  profits
PR'  Profit remittances  abroad
R  Foreign  reserves
RR  Legal  reserves
S  Savings
SUB  Subsidies
T  Net current  transfers
T'  Net transfers  from abroad
TD  Direct  taxes
TI  Indirect  taxes
VA  Value  added
WR  Workers,  remittances  from abroad
X  Exports (#)
Sector-specific  variables  and intersectoral  flows are represented  by the following  suffixes  at the
end of each variable:
b  Budgetary  government
c  Central  Bank
d  Banking  system
o  Other non-financial  public sector (SEEs)
g  Consolidated  non-financial  public sector
p  Private  sector
m  Consolidated  monetary  sector
f  Foreign  sector
t  Total4
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presented  in section  3.  Although  it is by no means  necossary  for the purposes  of this paper  to
maintain  such a large  amount  of detail  in  the budget  constrair-,ts,  the RMSM-X  model  is designed
as a  multi-purpose  model to be used for a multitude of tasKs  which potentially require such
de4ail.
1.2. THE  MARKETS
The  flow of funds is a useful accounting  framework  that helps to organize  the data in a
consistent  manner.  For policy analysis,  the consistency  framework  Is linked to a model that
contains  the behavioral  and  technical  relationships  among  variables.  These  relationships  Involve
five markets:  one goods market  and four asset markets. The specification  of the components
of supply and demand  in each of the markets  is presented  in section 3.  Here,  only the market
clearing conditions  are stated.
For simplicity,  the domestic economy  is assumed  to produce  only one composite  good
that can be used for domestic  consumption  and investment,  or sold abroad. Equilibrium  in the
gogds market requires:
(1. 1)  Y +  IM -cp  + cb + Ip  + Ib  +  Io  +  X
where  C, 1,  Y, X and IM  denote consumption,  investment,  output,  exports  and imports  of goods
and services,  respectively. All variables  are measured  in real terms.
The  model  considers  the  different  components  of money (currency  and demand  deposits)
as perfect substitutes. Therefore,  the equilibrium  condition in the money market is simply:
(1.2)  H  - md
There  is only one type of foreign-currency-denominated  asset  which can be held by all sectors.
Hence,  the equilibrium  condition in the foreign  credit market is:
(1.3)  Fb+  F  +F+  Fd  *- (Fr)d_  -F
The sum of the net demands  for foreign credit of each of the national sectors must equal the
total supply of foreign  credik.6
The domestic  b2nd, Issued  by the budtet, other  public  and/or private  sectors,  is held by
the private and/or banking sectors.  This mrn  eket  could be further disaggregated  into credit
provioed  by the financial  system  and domestic public  debt sold to the private sector. While  this
distinction  may appear  appropriate, it will only be relevant  for practical  purposes if the assets
are assumed  to be imperfect  substitutes  from the viewpoint  of at least  one economic  sector  and
If meaningful  behavioral  assumptions  can motivate  the imperfect  substitutability. Furthermore,
for each asset distinct supply and/or demand schedules would hav3 to  be specified.  For
simplicity  only one domestic  bond is considered  and the equilibrium  condition in the domestic
bond market is given by:
(1.4)  Bb  +  B' - Bd +  Bd
The  net supply of the domestic bond by the budget and other public sector, must equal  the net
demand  by the private  and banking sectors.
The equation that must be satisfied  in order to assure equilibrium  in the central bank's
credit market  is:
(1.5)  Cg'  - C:  +  CRd  +  CRd
Overall  credit extended  by the central bank is distributed  among the budget, the other public
sector and the banking system.
1.3. MODEL  CLOSURE  AND  SOLUTION  PROCEDURE
If none of the savings  variables  in the budget  constraints  is exogenously  determined,  the
model contains  eleven equations:  six budget constraints  and five market clearing conditions.
From Walras'  law only ten of these  equations  are independent. If all markets  clear and five of
the six sector's budget constraints are satisfied  then the budget constraint of the remaining
sector  is also satisfied. If, on the other hand, all sectors  are  on their budget constraint  and four
markets clear, then the remaining market always clears.  Consequently,  the system can be
solved  for ten endogenous  vpriables  with  the additional  mathematical  constraint  that each of the7
eleven equations must at least contain one endogenous variable.A' By specifying  additional
behavioral  functions,  It could be solved  for many  more intermediate  variables  but these  are not
truly endogenous. Given  the amount  of detail specified  in the budget constraints,  especially  of
the public sector, it is necessary  to add a reiatively  large set of exogenous  projection  rules for
such  variables  as transfers  between  different  sectors,  taxes,  subsidies  and factor income  for the
Government. However,  since these  variables  are only of limited importance  for ths analysis  of
the problem  of inflation  stabilization,  these  projection  rules are kept constant  across  simulations
(see  also section 3).
Typically, macroeonomic  models add to the basic structure of the model described
above a complete  set of estimated  behavioral  equations  for the supply and demand  sides of all
markets.  These behavioral  equations are functions of prices and quantities and allow the
simultaneous  solution of the model. The construction  of such a model requires  reliable  data,
stable estimated  parameters  and is quite resource  intensive. Even  in the case of Turkey,  data
is still limited and frequent changes in  ,olicy  regimes over this past decade make it almost
impossible  to find stable  parameters.  Therefore,  the solution  of the RMSM-X  model  is essentially
recursive  and contains  only a few local  simultaneitles  that can be  solved  analytically  (for  example
the trade  block and the goods r',arket). Hence,  solving  the model does not require  optimization
software  and takes  only a few  r.  ...  ,utes. A recursive  solution  procedure  does imply,  however,  that
markets  are closed with quantities  and, hence, are  eitiier supply or demand  determined. As a
result, it becomes necessary  to check the solution of the model "ex-post" and iterate  it further
if the solution  is not economically  plausible.
Figure  1.2  illustrates  the recursive  closure  that was  adopted  for the purpose  of this paper.
Given  a time path  for the budget constraints  of the non-financial  public sector (fiscal  policy)  and
a time path  for the rate of base money  growth (monetary  policy)  the model  will be solved  for the
target variables: inflation, growth and the level of foreign reserves. The arrows in the figure
show how the model is solved and the variables indicated on the arrows are the "closing"
variables  of the markets  or budget  constraints  they are associated  with. Starting  with monetary
policy on the supply  sde of the money  market,  the demand  side is solved  for the rate  of capacity
utilization (for details see section  3).  This variable  determines  the supply side of the goods
' If one or more equations  would not contain  at least  one selected  endogenous  variable,  these
equations would not be part of the system (but in fact, identities)  and the dimension of the
system as well as the number of variables  that can be solved  for would be reduced.8
FIGURE 1.  2:  STRUCT'E  OF THEMODEL
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market and ptivate investment  closes the market  on the demand  side.  The other parts of the
nodel are solved In a s inilar manner. Of course, nothing guarantees  that private investment
behaves  in an economically  meaningful  mariner  when solved for in the way described above.
Variables  such as the interest  rate, the rate of capacity utilization  and inflation  in general  have
awell-defined  impact on private investment  at least in terms of direction.  The solution of the
model must oe verified  ex-post  for its compatibility  with .he paths  of th. other variables.
2.  INFLAT1ON  STABIPZATllON:  THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORK
2.1. INFLATION  AND FISCAL  DEFICIfS IN A MUNDELL-FLEMING  MODEL
Introdiucing  a short-run Phillips  curve and the Government's  budget constraint in the
conventional  Mundell-Fleming  model provides us with an appropriate  tool to analyze  inflation
stabili.utiorn.  Since  Turkey  completely  opened  its capital  account  in August  1989,  perfect  capital
mobility is assumed.Y
The  level  of aggregate  demand  (M is the sum  of domestic  demand  or absorption (E)  and
net foreign  demand or the trade balance (TB):
(2.1)  Y - E  +  TB
Aggregate  supply is defined  as capacity utilization  (cu)  tmes  potential  output (Ye),
(2.2)  Y  - cu.YF
Net foreign demand is a negative  function  of the real exchange  rea (q) and a positive  function
of the level  of domestic income (Y):
(2.3)  TB - TB(q,Y)
The level  of domestic expenditure  depends  negatively  on the real interest  rate (r) and positively
on the lpvel  of income (Y):
~y  These  variants  of the Mundell-Fleming  model  have  been  discussed  extensively  in the economic
literature;  for an overview,  see for example  Stevenson  et. al. (1988).10
E-E(r,  Y.,  +r *  d+r'* d'- (7r+*Y)  *h)
E  xplicit consideration  of the Government's  budget constraint 1' adds a third deterrninant  to
domestic  expenditure:  the Inflation-adjusted  or opa itional deficit (G+r  i d+r-* d') where  0 denotes
the primary  deficit and d the debt GDP ratio, minus the revenue  that the public sector ohtains
from money creation (K+Y)  *h.  The latter consists of the erosion of money holdings due to
inflation,  the well-known  inflation  tax (v-h),  where h represents  the real money base as a share
of GDP,  and of the revenue  that accrues  to the provider  of money in a growing economy  (Y- h>.
The following assumptions  underlie the formulation  of equation (2.4):  (i) the multipliers of
government  expenditure  and taxes  are the same in absolute  value, (ii)  the possible distributive,
effects  of a shift from a "normalu  tax to the inflation  tax, or vice  versa,  would not have  any impaci
on the level of expenditure  and (iii) private agents do not anticipate  the burden of future taxes
(Ricardian  equivalence),  perceive  government  bonds  as net  wealth  and,  hence,  a bond-financed
increase in the public sector deficit would result in an increase in the level of  domestic
expenditure.
The supply side is represented  by a standard  Phillips  curve:
(2.5)  7  - W  +  (cu-cuN)  a>l
where ir  and cuN  refer to  expected inflation and "normal"  capacity utilization, respectively.
Equation (2.5) equates actual inflation  to the expected  inflation rate unless demand pressure
forces inflation  above its expected  level. Well known motivations  for a short-run  Phillips  Curve
are wage contracts (Fischer 1977ab,  Taylor (1980),  price contracts (Buiter 1980)  or imperfect
information  (Lucas 1973).
There  are three assets in the theoretical  model: base money, a domestic bond and a
foreign bond.  The latter  two are assumed  to be perfect substitutes  so that the interest parity
condition (expressed  in real terms) holds:
OJ  Including  the monetary  authorities.11
(2.6)  r  - r^  +  (q"-q)/q
where  q' is the expected  real exchange  rate. The equilibrium  condition  in the money market  is:
;2.7)  H/p  - k(r+r)  Y
where H is the base money  and p the price level. Equation  (2.7)  assumes  a simple  transactions
dernand  for base money.
Finally, the budget constraint of the public sector including the monetary authorities
shows the linkage between  fiscal deficits and money creation (see  Sargent and Wallace  1981,
Buiter  1 "33,  van Wijnbergen  1989  and Anand  and van Wijnbergen  1983).Y/  At any point in time,
a given primary deficit including possible quasi-fiscal  deficits arising  from the central bank's
involvement  in fiscal activities,  must be financed either by interest bearing liabilities (public
domestic and external  debt) or by non-interest  bearing liabilities  (base  money). Expressed  as
share  of GDP this budget constraint  can be written as follows:
(2.8)  e  + i-d  + e-i-d  - (6H+6D+e.6D')/p.Y
where  i and e are  the nominal  interest  rate  and exchange  rate,  respectively;  and D is the nominal
stock of public sector debt. Consequently,  open market  operations  of the central bank change
the composition of outstanding public liabilities between interest-bearing  and non-interest-
bearing. In this sense,  the monetary  authorities  control the amount of base money issued  and,
therefore,  the revenue  from the inflation  tax or seignorage. The inflation  tax is a current  tax that
affects  the holders  of base money proportionally. However,  this tax can be evaded  by lowering
the holdings  of base  money  and, hence,  inflation  tax revenue  will start  to decline  at some  inflation
rateY  Nevertheless,  over  the relevant  range  for the analysis  the revenue  from money creation
will decline as inflation falls.  This is one of the key aspects of  a disinflationary  program,
indicating  the need to find alternative  sources of financing  or to reduce  the fiscal deficit.
2/ For a complete  exposition  of fiscal policy in our IS-LM  framework  see  Artis (1979).
7  Econometric  estimates  put this inflation  rate in the Turkish  context at about 125%  per year.
At that rate, revenue  from inflation  tax is maximized.12
2.2. DISINFLATION  IN THE  MEDIUM-RUN  I'
In a medium-run  equilibrium  expectations  must be fulfilled, and, hence, the following
relations  must hold at all times:
(2.9)  W  sr
(2.10)  q  - q
Using (2.9) and (2.10) and making the appropriate substitutions,  the analytical framework
presented  in the previous  section reduces  to:
A
(2.11)  CUN.YF  _  E(r,cuN.YF,G*r.d+r.  d'  (W+Y)-h)  +  TB(q,cuN.YF)
(2.12)  H/p  - k(r+w)  cuN.yF
(2.13)  r  - r
Equations (2.11) and  (2.12) describes the equilibrium in the goods and money markets
respectively. Equation (2.13)  is the medium-run  version of the interest parity condition. The
system (2.11)-(2.13)  can be solved for q, w and r.
In the case of Turkey,  the inflation  rate has remained  at a high level equilibrium  for the
last three years because of the public sector's inability to finance its expenditures  through
conventional  taxes. Consequently,  the Government  had to resort  to money creation  to obtain
the needed revenue  through the inflation  tax.  Inflation stabilization  requires  essentially  finding
a substitute  for the inflation  tax.  The revenue  from the inflation  component  of money creation
can be replaced  either by raising  taxes, cutting expenditure,  or by increasing  domestic and/or
foreign borrowing (6d and/or 6d).
First, take the case of an increase  in direct taxes to replace  the revenue  lost from a
decline In monetary growth and inflation.  Given  the assumptions  made above, the level of
demand  and, hence,  the goods market  equilibrium  is unaffected  according  to equation  (2.11)  as
the rise in demand  due to the decline in W*-h  Is offset  by a fall in 8, the fiscal deficit. However,
1/ For more  elaborate  models  of disinflation  with  forward  looking agents  see  for example  Drazen
and Helpman  (1987)  and Obsffeld (1985).13
the lower  inflation  reduces  the opportunity  cost of holding money  and increases  the demand  for
base money for a given real interest  rate.  In the new equilibrium,  the real interest  rate and
exchange  rate remain  unaltered.  The  on!y  effect  of disinflation  is to increase  ti..  demand  for real
balances  which will be satisfied  by a temporary  reduction  of the rate of inflation  below  the rate
of money growth while  after this transitory  period  the rate  of inflation,  nominal depreciation  and
money growth will all be the same again.
This result  would  be slightly  altered  If domestic bonds and foreign bonds are not perfect
substitutes  or if the increase  in money balances  reduces  the demand  for bonds so much that
world interest  rates are affected. Although  the second condition is unlikely  to hold in the case
of Turkey,  the first one is almost certainly  valid. Hence,  the increased  holdings of money  would
reduce  the demand  for the domestic bond and increase  the interest  rate at a given supply. The
real  exchange  rate  will have  to depreciate  somewhat  to maintain  goods market  equilibrium.  The
main result is that a package of monetary restraint and supportive fiscal policy would be
necessary and sufficient to  reduce permanently  inflation in the absence of price rigidities.
Furthermore,  if the reduction in the inflation rate brings about the expected increase in the
volume and efficiency of investment,  one would expect that the medium-run  growth rate of
output would increase.
Consider  the case in which the Government  replaces  the revenue  lost from the decline
in inflation  by increased  borrowing. The  additional  Government  bonds  issued  are  at least  partially
perceived  as net wealth by the private sector.  Consequently,  as can be seen from equation
(2.11)  the level  of aggregate  demand  increases  which, in the Turkish  context  of an open capital
account,  would  raise  the expected  real  exchange  rate  as well  as the actual  one and bring in extra
resources  through short-term  capital flows.  However,  at this new equilibrium both fiscal and
current  account deficits  could well reach unsustainable  levels  as debt dynamics  would become
unstable  (see  Text Box 2.1). In the end, the Government  will have  to resort to money creation
again,  moving the economy back to a high inflation  path (Sargent  and Wallace 1981).
2.3.  SHORT-RUN  PRICE  INERTIA  AND  THE  COSTS  OF  DISINFLATION
In the short-run,  inflation  may be temporarily  unresponsive  to changes  in money growth.
If private agents' inflationary  expectations  do not react immediately  to the reduction  in money
growth and/or nominal contracts  cannot be adjusted  instantaneously,  inflation  will temporarily14
Text  Box  2.1: Sustalnabllltv  of the  Fiscal  Deficit
Deffne  the  public  debt  to 3P1 ratio  as:
b  - B
P-Y
and  differentiate  to obtain:
6b - _  * (i  + Y)-b
P.y
The  Government  budget  constraint  can  be  written  as  (all  in percent  of GDP):
6b - e + i-b - (  + ')-b - (r  + +)-h
with  6b - 0 as  a minimum  condition  for a sustainable  level  of public  debt. The  steady  state  level  of debt  that
satisfies  this condition  Is:'/
b - r-  (X + t)-h
Y-r
with  50%  Inflation,  growth  at  5%,  r = 4%  and  e  5.2%  of  GDP  as in 1990:
b - .052  -t.50 + .05l* .086  =  47%  of  GDP
.05 -.04
with  10%  inflation  and  all other  assumptions  the  same  while  taking  into  account  some  remonetization  (reflected
in  the  increase  In  h):
b  .052  -i0  + .05L. .12 = 340%  of GDP
.05  -.04
a solution  which  is clearly  unsustainable.
I/  If the  real  interest  rate  is larger  than  the  real  growth  rate  then  it can  be  shown  thit the  Government  budget
constraint  is an  unstable  first  difference  equation  in public  debt  for  a given  monetary  policy.
remain high while money growth has already  been reduced.21  This inertia is introduced in the
model by substituting  the following  short-run  equations  for equations (2.9)  and (2.10):
(2.9')  xr  - f(ff.,e,...)
(2.10')  q  - g(jq... 
Expected  inflation and the expected real exchange rate are no longor always equal to their
realized  value,  but deviate  from it in the short run. Inflationary  expectations  could be a function
i'  For an overview  of the role of inflationary  rigidities  in disinflation  attempts  in Latin  America  see
in Kiguel  and Liviatan  (1988). Dornbusch  (1985)  gives  a more general  treatment  of the problem.15
of past inflation,  exchange  rate movements  and other variables  as indicated in equation (2.9').
The expected  real exchange  rate could be a function of a long-term  equilibrium  rate and other
variables  such  as fiscal  and monetary  policy. With this short-run  formulation,  the system (2.11)-
(2.13)  is modified  to:
(2.11')  cu.YF - E(r,cu.YF,G+r.d+r.d*-(1r+Y).h)  + TB(q,cu.YF)
AF
(2.12')  H/p  - k(r+f(wr,,e,.  .. ))*cu.yF
(2.13')  r  - r*  +  (g(q,...)-q)/q
A
(2.14)  1-  f(w.1,e,...)  + c.(CU_CUN)
This  system  can be solved  for capacity  utilization  (cu),  the real interest  rate (r),  the real exchange
rate (q) and inflation (w). In the short-run,  departures  from full-employment  are possible when
actual  inflation  is different  from expected  inflation. Given  the inertia  of inflation,  a reduction  in  the
growth rate  of money would result  in a fall in the real money  supply  as inflation  adjusts  less  than
proportionally. This leads to an increase  in the real interest rate, a real appreciation  and a
reduction in capacity utilization. After a lag, when expectations  are modified and contracts
expire,  inflation  would  fall, reversing  the Initial  reduction  in the real money supply. Note  that this
result  follows irrespective  of whether  the Government  supports the monetary  contraction  with a
fiscal contraction or not.  However,  if the problem of inflationary  momentum is an issue of
credibility  12, the absence  of fiscal  action is likely  to worsen  the short-run  losses incurred  during
disinflation. In addition,  the nature  of debt and wage contracts in Turkey  may prov!de  another
source of adjustment  cost.
3.  IMPLEMENTATION  IN THE  RMSM-X  MODEL  D
In order  to simulate  the RMSM-X  model  and  to implement  the above  described  theoretical
framework  it is necessary  to specify  the demand  and supply  side of all markets  and incorporate
some projection  rules  for variables  in the budget  constraints  of the six sectors  that do not appear
in the market  clearing  conditions. Two key considerations  influence  this implementation:  (i) the
'u- For an extensive  treatment  of the credibility  issue,  see Sargent 1986.
'  Those readers not interested  in the technical aspects of the implementation  can skip this
section without loss of continuity.16
importance  of short-run  rigidities  leading  to adjustment  costs,  and (ii)  the recursive  nature of the
solution.
3.1 THE  GOODS  MARKET
The  economy is assumed  to be operating  under  a fixed coefficients  production  function
and capital  is the constraining  factor. Therefore,  potential  output  YF is linked  to past investment
as follows:
(3.1)  yF  + 
where  B is the inverse  of the ICOR,  which is assumed  to be exogenous. Since 1,  represents  total
Investment  In the economy, it is assumed  to have the same efficiency  across sectors. Total
investment  is defined  as:
h
(3.2)  I,  - E  lI  j  - b,o,p.
i-i
Actual  output in the economy  does not necessarily  equal  potential  output as the rate  of capacity
utilization  (cu) may differ from unity:
(3.3)  y  _  yF.CU
How cu is determined  is explained  below.
Given  the choice  of closure  of the model,  the time path  of public components  of demand
is determined  exogenously:
(3.4)  Cb -
(3.5)  1o  I.
(3.6)  Ib - |b
Private  consumption is a function of disposable  income adjusted  for the Inflation  tax and the
nominal  component  of domestic interest  payments:17
(3.7)  Cp - c*Yd
(3.8)  Yd  - [VAp+Tbp+E  (Tf+WR*-PR)+rc.B  i+rD0 DD,+rDTDTT+
P&Ld-TDp-E  r* Fp /Pc
Exports are specified as a function of the real exchange rate q, and the level of foreign income:
A  A
(3.9)  X - (,+C  q+1y  *Y )  x.1
where the  elasticities are taken from the  equation estimated  by  Arsian and  van Wijnbergen
(1990):
(3.10)  log  X - -0.01  +  1.15  log  q  +  0.26  log  q1 +  1.5  log  Y'
(1.8)  (2.48)  (0.64)  (2.45)
le  - 0.43,  TSLS,  SMPL - 69-87
and the constant and lagged real exchange rate were dropped as they are Insignificantly different
from zero.  The growth rate of foreign output is taken from the Bank's standard projections.  The
determination of the real exchange rate will be discussed below.  Imports consist of five different
components:
(3.11)  IM  - IMC +  IM'  +  IM°''  +  IMV +  IfM
All  components,  except  IMG, non-monetary  gold  imports,  are  linked to  their  corresponding
aggregate demand components and to the real exchange rate:
(3.12)  IME  - (1+60 Cq+u7c  i ).IE  .1
( 3.13 )  ISv - ( 1+e I-q+171,,  It)  ,
(3.14)  plL  - (1+COL*q+% 1- LY+  OPI,PL ) * INL
A  A0
(3.15)  Iv  _  (1+-  q+ttvY)
Import demand for consumption,  IMc, investment IM', and intermediate inputs, IMV,  are estimated
econometrically while imposing all  i?, = 1.  The results are (t-statistics in parenthesis):
(3.12)'  log  IMc-  -2.43  - 2.63  log  q
ct  (-2.69)(-6.94)18
R2 - .55,  S.E. - 0.68, D.W. - 1.26, SMPL 81-88, OLS
(3.13)'  log  at  - -1.55 - 2.16 log q
It (-15.5)  (-3.26)
R2 - .64,  S.E.  - 0.18,  D.W.  - 1.09,  SMPL  81-88,  OLS
(3.15)'  log .I=  - -2.19 - 0.53 log q
Y  (-40.3)  (-1.46)
R 2 - .26,  S.E.  - 0.097,  D.W.  - 1.44.  fPL  B1-88,  OLS
Import demand  for crude oil, IMOL,  was not econometrically  estimated  and the price elasticities
with respect  to the real exchange rate and its own relative  price, PO,  were set to zero for the
simulations  implying  that there  Is  no substitutability  away  from the use of oil during  the projection
period. It is projected  as a function of domestic production  with a constant  elasticity. Imports
of monetary  gold are projected  exogenously:
(3.16)  im  - IMa
Given  the specification  of these  equations,  the trade  block is simultaneous  with the demand  side
of the goods market, since contemporaneous  demand components determine the import
demands.  The remaining variable in the goods markets is private investment, lp, which is
determined  endogenously  to clear the market.
The preceding discussion of the goods market concerns only real variables,  but the
model also calculates  various prices and nominal  variables. These  follow simple rules:
(3.17)  p  _  (pe  PE-1)
(3.18)  pi  - (1-01m)iP  + AM  PIMI
(3.19)  PIMC  E PIMI
(3.20)  pIMY  - E-pc
(3.21)  POIL  - E 5 PIMV
(3.22)  PiM  E-I>L
(3.23)  Px  - E.p19
Equation  (3.17)  defines  the period average  GDP  deflator (p) as the geometric  average  of end-
of-period  GDP  deflators  (PE).  The  deflator  for investment  goods (p) is a weighted  average  of the
domestic (p) and foreign (p,m)  cost of investment  goods, with  am  the weight of imports in total
investment. Equations  (3.19)  to (3.22)  define the set of import deflators as the product of the
corresponding  foreign prices  and the average  nominal  exchange  rate (E). Once  these  prices  are
obtained, it is straightforward  to  calculate the nominal variables corresponding to the real
componont  of the goods market. The goods market  equilibrium  condition or national  accounts
in nominal terms can be written as:
(3.24)  peY  +  pi,eM  - px'X  +  poCt  +  p1 .It
This equation  is used  to determine  Pc ct and,  given  real  consumption,  the consumer  price index
can be derived  as follows:
(3.25)  Pc  -pY  + RmOM - p*X  - p,61t
This ensures  mathematical  consistency  among prices,  real and nominal  variables.12i
3.2. THE MONEY  MARKET
Total supply of money (Ml) is given by:
(3.26)  Ml'  T-H
with H representing  base money:
(3.27)  H - CUp +  CUd +  RR
which consists  of currency in hands of the public (CUe),  vault cash (CUd)  and required  reserves
(RR). The money multiplier,  t,  is defined  as:
i'  It does not, however,  ensure  economic  consistency  which would require  as many prices  and
material  balances  as there  are goods.20
(3.28)  1  - (cctl)/(cc+re)
with re the reserve/deposit  ratio and, cc the currency/deposit  ratio. These  ratio's are specified
exogenously.
Demand  for money is specified  as follows:
(3.29)  - K  (NO LTD.  e).CU.Y
PE
Transactions  are proxied  by actual output (cu YF)  and the inverse  of velocity  K ...)  is a function
of price expectations,  nominal interest  rates and the rate of depreciation  of the exchange  rate.
This equation is econometrically  estimated  as:
(3.29)'  Md -[  6.846  - 3.119(1+w)  - 2.913(1+i.)  - 0.454(1+e)
PE  (3.14)  (-3.27)  (-2.99)  (-1.09)
-0.109  X854 ].CU_yF
(-2.68)
R2 - 0.77,  S.Z.  - 0.045,  D.W.  - 2.54,  TSLS AR(1),  84.1-89.4
where  X854  is a dummy  for a statistical  outlier in the series  on interest  rates  in the fourth  quarter
of 1985  only.
Since the focus of the analysis is on price rigidities,  a short-run price equation was
estimated  in order to project PE:
(3.30)  P-  _  P1  - 0.6697r'  +  0.367e' 1 +  0.233'M - 0.278  (CU-CU.,)
PE. 1 (6.18)  (2.51)  (2.02)  (-2.37)
+  0.135  X842
(3.86)
R-  0.41,  S.E.  - 0.034,  D.W.  - 2.43,  TSLS,  82.1-89.4
where  >  is the proportion of the exchange  rate depreciation  orthogonal  on the inflation  rate:
A
(3.31)  e  - 0.887X
(11.27)21
This  reduces the  coefficient or  the  lagged inflation rate  in  equation (3.30) to  0.3436.
Consequently,  the sum of the coefficients  on the nominal variables  in equation (3.30)  adds to
0.944, Insignificantly  different from unity as needed for  the model to  satisfy steady state
conditions.
Equation  (3.30)  is observationally  equivalent  to a system of equations  of the type:
A
(3.32)  7  - f(1',M'cu-cu,)
(3.33)  w  - f(7r,,e,)
on which a particular  process  of inflationary  expectations  is imposed. Empirical  analysis  in Vieira
da Cunha  et al (1990)  indicates  the dominant  importance  of lagged  inflation  and exchange  rate
behavior  for the formation  of inflationary  expectations. Hence,  in order to maintain  consistency
between  the estimated  price equation (3.30)  and the expected  inflation  rate used in the money
demand  equation (3.29),  expectations  are calculated  according to (3.33). Using  the estimated
parameters,  this yields:
(3.34)  - 0.4582  1r1  +  0.5165  e,
This equation approximately  satisfies  the steady state conditions.
Three  remaining  variables  are undetermined  in this system of equations. By imposing
the international  real interest rate arbitrage condition the actual real exchange rate can be
determined  and the rate of nominal exchange  depreciation  can be solved  for as foreign prices
are exogenous  and domestic inflation  is determined  in the price equation. This condition can
be written  as:
(3.35)  r  - r'  +g
q.,
where r is the real domestic bond rate, of which the time path is specified  exogenously,  r is the
foreign real bond rate taken  from the Bank's projections  of international  variables  and qE  Is the
expected real exchange rate.  This rate is a function of the fiscal deficit, e, and the current
account,  CA, both observed  with a lag:22
(3.36)  q-  - h(B.,,  CA.,)
Since an appreciatlon  is defined  as a decline of qE, it is assumed  that hq, <0 and hcA.l>o,  with
the parameters  calibrated  to match the most recent  historical  observation,  I.e., 1990.
The usual relation  between  nominal and real interest  rates  and inflation  determines  the
nominal Interest  rate used In the money demand  function:
(3.37)  (1  +  i m)  - (1  + w)*(l  +  r)
This completes the specification  of all the variables entering  the demand side of the money
market  except for the rate of capacity utilization. Hence,  the money market clearing  condition
is solved  for this rate  by equating  demand  and supply  as specified  In equations  (3.26)  and (3.29).
Since  the rate  of capacity  utilization  enters  the goods market  equilibrlum  as well, monetary  policy
influences  actual  output and leads  to a short-run  Phillips  curve in the model. The dynamics  of
the model for a given shock are largely  determined  by equation (3.30)  as a fall in the ,ate of
capacity  utilization  leads  to a reduction  in price expectations,  raises  real  supply of money  which,
in turn, raises the rate of capacity utilization  in the next period. In the medium-term,  when  the
rate of capacity  utilization  attains  its natural  level,  all nominal  variables  will grow at the same  rate.
3.3. THE  FOREIGN  CREDIT  MARKET
Since it is assumed that Turkey  would not be facing an external credit constraint,  the
demands  for foreign credit of all domestic sectors need to be specified. The public sector's
foreign borrowing,  here expressed  in terms of its stock, is given exogenously:
(3.38)  F- -
(3.39)  F  - Fo
(3.40)  F  - F:
Similarly, foreign exchange deposits of  the  public sector held at  the  central bank  are
predetermined:
(3  41)  F&  - FX23
(3.42)  FX.  - FXx
Foreign  borrowing  by the domestic banking system  and the private  sector are inversely  related
to the real money supply with a parameter  calculated  on the most recent  historical  observation
(1989):
(3.43)  F-d  fd(M/PE)  f  d  <  0
(3.44)  Fp  - fp(M/PE)  fFp  <  0
Foreign  exchange deposits held by the private sector in the domestic banking system are a
function of demand  deposits of the private  sector:
(3.45)  FPX  - a*  DD/EE
Finally,  the domestic banking  system must deposit some  of its foreign exchange  at the central
bank in the form of required reserves:
(3.46)  FXd,  - rrF  *  FXpd
where  rrFx  is the reserve  coefficient  determined  by the central  bank.
On the SuDply  side, it is assumed  that Turkey  can borrow in the international  market at
the going interest  rate:
(3.47)  - in.
in is  the foreign  interest  rate  for "new"  borrowing  by Turkey. All  sectors  are  assumed  to be  facing
the same interest  rate. Given  this rate for new borrowing,  it is straightforward  to calculate  the
weighted average  interest  rate that Turkey  Is facing:
(3.48)  iL-  .iF. /Fi  +  in e  (F;  - F;)/F,
where  i;and F. are  the interest  rate  and dollar  arnount  of already  existing  credit  and Fe  is the total
demand  for credit obtained by summing equations  (3.38)  - (3.40)  and (3.43)  - (3,44).24
To complete  the set of foreign  currency denominated  variables, the foreign exchange
reserves of  the  domestic  banking  system  and  the  central  bank  still  need to  be  specified.
Domestic banks hold free reserves as a share of private sector foreign exchange deposits:
(3.49)  RESd  - rff:X*FXPd
Consequently, as all variables entering the balance of payments have been determined, central
bank reserves are the residual.
3.4.  CENTRAL  BANK CREDIT
The central bank sets its rate of growth of base money as a policy variable and obtains
whatever reserves the balance of payments outcome determines.  Consequently, total supply of
central bank credit is determined as follows:
(3.50)  CR: - H-Er  (RESe  - F^c  - FXd, - FX  - FX,,,) +  NOLC
where NOL, is net other liabilities.
Demand for central bank credit from the non-financial public sector is given exogenously:
(3.51)  CR4  CRb
(3.52)  C  Rd  CR.
Consequently, the demand fov central bank rediscounts from the domestic banking system is
determined residually in this market:
(3.53)  CRd - CR, - CR: - CRd
3.5.  THE DOMESTIC  BOND  MARKET
The  domestic  bond  is a  composite  asset, incorporating  all  remaining  assets in  the
economy.  As a result of the fact that the private sector is at ihe same time borrower (credits)
and lender (time deposits) to the domestic banking system, these offsetting transactions were25
netted  out In order to obtain the net demands  and supplies  for domestic bond.
Supply of bonds from non-financial  public entities  is given by the budget constraints  of
the respective  secto s as they result  from policy decisions:
(3.54)  B-b  Bb
(3.55)  B', - B.
Given  the predetermination  of the money supply, demand  for deposits  from the private  sector
and rediscounts  obtained  from the central bank,  the budget constraint  of  the domestic banking
system  dictates  the demand of  bonds in the market:
(3.56)  Be  - DDP  +  CRd + EEe(Fd + FXd  - FX,  - RESC) +
NOLd  - CUd  - Dd,
where  NOLd  are net other liabilities,  CUd  is vault  cash  and Dd, is required  reserve  deposits  at the
central  bank. The market  is closed by solving  for the private  sector's  availability  of net domestic
credit:
(3.57)  BP  - Bd  B  BO  -
3.6. PROJECTING  OTHER  VARIABLES
A comparison  of the market  clearing  conditions  and the budget  constraints  indicates  that
the latter  contain  more  variables  than are  included  in demand  and supply  functions  of the various
markets. Given  the choice of closure,  it is clear that the budget  constraints  of the non-financial
public sectors  are predetermined  by policy choice, within  the limit  of the adding-up  constraints.
The variables  in those budget constraints  are projected  as follows:
(3.58)  FIo - fip-Y
(3.59)  OFIb  - ofispeY
(3.60)  TI  - tYop.Y  + t,M-P,MOIM
(3.61)  TDp  tp.VAp
(3.62)  TDO  - tOeFL,
(3.63)  SUB  - t,p.-Y26
(3.64)  Tb  - (1 + W)Tb.1
(3.65)  Tp - (1 + W)Ts
(3.66)  KTb - (1 + W)KTb,
(3.67)  KTd  - (7  +  W)-KTd,
(3.68)  KTbP - (1  +  7r).KTbt,
(3.69)  KTop  - (1 + 'X)KTp.,
(3.70)  TF  - (1 +  1)To,
(3.71)  P&LC  - P&L
Factor  income of the budget (OFIb)  and the SEEs  (Fl) is projected  as a share of nominal  GDP,
with parameters  fn,  ofi, that are adjusted  to reflect  the time path of policies. Similarly,  indirect
taxes (TI)  and direct taxes from the private sector (TDp)  and SEEs (TDO)  as well as subsidies
(SUB) are linked with parameters to their respective tax bases.  Transfers, T.,,, TP, KTb,,  KTbd,
KT,,, T% are projected in constant real terms and distributed  profits by the central bank are
projected  exogenously. Value  added of the private  sector is defined  as:
(3.72)  VAp  - p*Y - FIo - OFIb  - TI + SUB
Various  transactions  between  the foreign  sector and the domestic private  sector are projected
as follows:
(3.73)  T,p-  (1 +  T)T1 ,
(3.74)  WR  WR
(3.75)  DFI'  - DFI
with WR  =  workers' remittances,  T4 = other transfers  and DFI  = direct foreign investment.
Finally,  the domestic banking system distributes  its profit to the private  sector:
(3.76)  P&LC  - P&Le
4.  INFLATION  STABILIZATION:  POUCY  SCENARIOS
4.1. RECENT  ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENTS  IN TURKEY
Key  economic  indicators  for the past five  years  show the rather  high degree  of instability27
of the Turkish economy (see Table 4.1).  Economic growth, although high on average, fluctuated
between 1.1% and 8.8% while inflation remained relatively high.  The fiscal deficit appears to be
the main cause of the instability, and its financing can explain the peculiar relationship between
inflation and growth.  The fiscal expansion in 1987  managed to maintain high capacity utilization
and economic  growth and was largely financed by foreign  borrowing of the central bank and,
hence,  did  not  immediately  lead  to  higher  inflation.  Nevertheless,  the  high  deficit  was
unsustainable and the contraction in 1988 lead to a recession in the industrial sector at the end
of the year and a significant decline in  growth in the  period  1988-89.S3  Inflation accelerated
sharply in 1988 and remained high thereafter, however, mainly because of unsterilized purchases
of foreign reserves by the central bank which had become concerned with its deteriorating net
foreign exchange position as the result of past foreign borrowing on behalf of the Treasury. The
continuing structural transformation of the banking system and increasing sophistication of the
financial intermediaries also lead to a structural fall in the demand for base money, requiring a
higher inflation rate for a given amount of seignorage.
Before 1990, monetary policy was essentially accommodating and base money was used
to finance any residual gap of the fiscal deficit. In 1990,  the monetary authorities announced and
implemented a contractionary  monetary program, reducing the rate of reserve money growth
from 80% in 1989 to below 50% in 1990. At the same time, mainly for political reasons, the fiscal
authorities could not prevent a further widening of the deficit.  This mix of expansionary fiscal and
contractionary monetary policy led to upward pressure on domestic interest rates and a sharp
squeeze on domestic credit available to the private sector.  However, in August 1989 the capital
account had been opened completely and tV.3  policy mix attracted a large volume of short-term
cp.pital inflows.  As can be seen from Table 4.1, notwithstanding the sharp deterioration of the
current account, the central bank had to purchase more than $1.2 billion in foreign exchange in
a largely unsuccessful attempt to slow the real appreciation of the Turkish lira.  Nevertheless  the
impact  on  inflation  was  quite  modest  as  the  year-on-year rate of  consumer  price  inflation
remained above 60% while the wholesale price index dropped to a rate of increase of about 55%.
The Middle  East crisis  had  only  a modest  impact  on  inflation as  the  central  bank  did  not
accommodate  the increase in  if  iternational oil prices and an ambiguous  impact  on the fiscal
position as higher expenditure was offset by  increased revenue from petroleum excise taxes.
Moreover, Turkey's role in the crisis was compensated by large foreign assistance.
'3'  It should also be noted that adverse weather conditions led to a significant drop in agricultural
output  in 1989 (11%).28
Table  4.1:  Turkey  - Key Macroeconomic  Indicators
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
GDP  Growth  8.3  7.4  3.9  1.1  8.2
GDP  deflator  31.7  38.2  66.5  64.2  56.4
CPI inflation  34.6  38.9  75.4  69.6  66.3
WPI inflation  29.6  32.1  68.3  69.6  54.7
Fiscal  Deficit 1/  6.0  9.6  6.9  8.0  10.1
Current  Account 2/  -1465.0  -806.0  1596.0  966.0  -2611.0
Official  Reserve  Change  2/  545.0  649.0  421.0  2510.0  1255.0
Real  Exchange  Rate  3/  100.0  98.5  97.6  105.3  123.7
Source: SPO,  Central  Bank
1  /  Percent  of GDP, including  net lending
2/  US$  Million, period  flow
3/  Up is appreciation
The Turkish  central  bank announced  its contractionary  monetary  program in early 1990
in an attempt  to force the fiscal regime  towards more  debt-financing  by lowering  the amount of
monetization  of public  interest-bearing  debt. On the other  hand,  the fiscal  authorities  announced
plans for taxes and expenditure  that would be feasible, if at all, only in a regime  where some
deficits continue to be monetized. Such a combination of monetary and fiscal policy were
incompatible;  if the monetary  authority  would refuse  forever  to monetize  any government  debt
then  the arithmetic  of the budget  constraint  would  compel  the fiscal  authorities  to back  down and
swing  the budget  into balance;  if the fiscal  authority  were to stick to its guns,  the same  arithmetic
would  compel  the monetary  authorities  to monetize  large  parts  of the deficit. In  the Turkish  case,
this policy conflict appears  to be resolved  in favor of the fiscal authorities,  at least temporarily.
During the first quarter of  1991,  the central bank has been forced to triple its credit to the
Treasury  and consequently  has refused  to announce  a monetary  program for this year. This29
does not bode well for future inflation  as private  agents  will certainly  incorporate  this change in
policy regime and revise  their inflationary  expectations  upward.
Even  if the central  bank had been  able  to limit  monetary  expansion  as it did in 1990,  fiscal
d3ficits  of the current  magnitude  in  Turkey  are  simply not financeable.  Due to the Government's
emphasis  on domestic borrowing,  total domestic  public  debt,  excluding  debt held by the central
bank, rose more than 4 percentage  points of GNP in 1990. This implies  a sizeable  shift in the
portfolio of domestic investors  toward public paper, but there  are limits  to such a policy, since
public debt, just like private  debt, must ultimately  be backed by the net present  value  of future
income  streams. In order  for such  a policy to be credible  it must  not only be feasible,  but private
economic  agents must also believe  that it is feasible. However,  during the same  year (1990)  as
the monetary  authorities  were  implementing  a pre-announced  program  to reduce  the growth  rate
of base money, the fiscal deficit rose to unprecedented  levels. This is hardly the appropriate
signal  upon which private  economic  agents  will accept  a promise  to run  future surpluses  without
raising  eyebrows. Furthermore,  the 1991  Annual  Program  contains  little, if anything,  that would
lead  to a medium-term  structural  improvement  of the fiscal  deficit,  and past experience  in Turkey
has revealed  the willingness  of the public sector to resort to inflationary  financing of the fiscal
deficit. Consequently,  since the second half  of 1990,  interest  rates  on Treasury  Bills have risen
continuously  while inflation  remained  fairly stable. In March 1991  interest  rates  rose rapidly  to
about 85% for 3-month  Treasury  bi'!s while  inflation  expectations  were still around  65%. A real
interest  rate of this level  is certainly  in excess  of potential  real growth of the economy  and leads
to :Jnsustainable  debt accumulation  for a given monetary policy. Hence,  the shift in monetary
policy  observed  in the beginning  of 1991  was  not unexpected.  The  simulations  presented  below
show this trade-off  betwe n deficit  reduction  and inflation. However,  in order to make  the case
for inflation  reduction  one needs  to address  the issue  whether  inflation  is costly  for society  or not.
After  all, inflation  is just a tax on a particular  type of assets  and if it does not imply any real  costs
there is no a priori reason  why governments  should not use this type of tax.
4.2.  COSTS  OF  INFLATION
In  the absence  of a complete  adjustrrent  of the economy  to high inflation,  mainly  through
indexing, persistent  high inflation  tends to be associated  with pervasive  distributive  effects  and
is likely to adversely  affect medium-run growth.  There are no good examples  in which an30
economy has successfully  adjusted  to inflation  through indexing mechanisms. Indexation  is
often incomplete, asynchronized, backward-looking  or tied to  indicators which affect the
contracting  parties  in different  ways. As a result,  relative  prices  are  not only distorted  but inflation
also tends to raise uncertainty  about future real variables. The Turkish reality contains many
examples  of inflation  induced distortions.
Inflation can affect medium-term  growth adversely  through its negative  impact on the
marginal  productivity  of capital  and the share  of output devoted  to investment. The  effect  of the
shift  of portfolios  out of fixed  investment  as the inflation  rate  increases  is somewhat  controversial,
as It is against  the traditional  Tobin-Mundell  effect.'J4  Theoretical  support for a negative  relation
between  inflation  and capital  formulation  can  be found  in McKinnon  (1973)  and  Stockman  (1981).
Their  arguments  are based on the concept  of money as a store of value and on the existence
of a cash-in-advance  constraint,  respectively.-'  Casual  econometric  analysis  for Turkey  shows
the negative  impact of inflation  on the share  of private  investment  (1) in output (t - statistics  in
parenthesis,  sample 1973-88):
(4.1) log  IP  - -1.872  - 0.295  RECB  - 0.306  zr
GDP  (-28.1)  (-2.99)  (-2.66)
R1  - 0.42,  S.E.  - 0.106,  D.W. - 1.30
Although  the econometric  fit of the equation  could be improved,  the significant  negative  sign on
the inflation  rate supports  this conjecture. The  real effective  cost of borrowing  (RECB)  also has
the expected  significantly  negative  sign.
Theory  also suggests  that the marginal  efficiency  of capital is adversely  affected  by the
rate of inflation  independent  of its impact  on the volume of investment,  mainly  due to difficulties
14  This effect anticipates  more private fixed investmAnt  as investors shift out of real money
balances  and into other assets  when inflation  increases  (Tobin 1980).
L'  McKinnon  argues that if real money balances are needed to purchase  capital goods and
investment is lumpy and mainly self-financed,  savings in the form of money will ease the
purchase  of capital goods.  Low real return  on money balances (i.e. high inflation)  will reduce
the role of money as a store of value.  Stockman shows that if money is used to purchase
investment  goods, the existence  of a cash-in-advance  constraint  will lower  the steady-state  value
of the capital stock.31
in observing and adjusting  relative  prices in a high inflation  environment. This is borne out by
an econometric  specification  of potential  output  growth (t-statlstics  in parenthesis,  sample 1973-
88, annual  data):
A  A
(4.2)  - -0.117  +  0.543  It  - 0.052  3'  +  1.47  L  +  0.0001 X
GDP  GDP
(-1.75)  (3.05)  (-2.33)  (2.95)  (1.31)
R2  0.66,  D.W.  - 2.37,  S.E.  - 0.0156
As expected,  a larger  share of investment  in GDP  as well as in an increase  in the labor  force (1
F)  have a significantly  positive effect on potential  growth.  However,  the inflation rate has a
separate  significantly  r,egative impact  on  growth  indicative  of a backward-sloped,  long-run  Phillips
curve.  Kormendi  and Meguire  (1985) in a large  cross-country  study, found a similar  significantly
negative  sign of inflation  in a regression  on growth.  !
Although the adverse impact of  inflation on income distribution is more difficult to
establish  empirically  and while the decline in the share of wage and salary payments  in value
added  over  the last decade  in Turkey  can certainly  not exclusively  be blamed  on rising inflation,
there are good theoretical reasons  to expect redistributions  of income with high and volatile
inflation. Since inflation  is a tax on holdings of money balances,  it affects disproportionately
the less sophisticated  groups of society which are liquidity constrained  or do not dispose of
mechanisms  to avoid the inflation  tax.  Bracket  creep of the income  tax system further raises
the relative  burden  of taxation  on the lower  income  groups  while  withholding  taxes on wage and
salary income produce  the same result compared  to the treatment  of income from profits and
rents which is typically  taxed with a much longer  lag. The relative  worsening  of the position of
wage and salary earners  cannot be continued indefinitely  and demands  for restoration  of real
wages as well as increased indexation  have taken strong hold in the recent past in Turkey.
These developments have also undermined support from  large popular groups for  the
Government's  policies and may prove an additional  obstacle  in a disinflationary  program.
In addition,  public  debt is not indexed  and interest  rates  are  based  on past  rates,  Implying
that there is more  than one way in which the fiscal  authorities  would benefit  from a resurgence
of inflation  as it would erode  the real  value of outstanding  debt. Private  bondholders  would be
/'The  export to GDP ratio was included in the regression  to capture possible technological
externalities  from trade and turns out to have  the proper sign but insufficient  significance.32
taxed as the ex-post nomral  interest rate would be higher than the one at which private
bondholders  had Initially  contracted  these bonds, and the ex-post  real rate of return  would be
lower than the anticipated one.  This is just one more example of how inflation Increases
uncertainty  in the Turkish  economy.
4.3. FISCAL  ADJUSTMENT  FOR  SUSTAINABLE  DISINFLATION
The conceptual  analysis  of section  2 shows that a permanent  reduction in Inflation  will
come about only by a coordinated  fiscal and monetary  contraction. The fiscal contraction  is
needed  because  of the loss  of seignorage  resulting  from the slowdown  in monetary  growth. As
was indicated  in Text  Box 2.  1, the current  fiscal  situation  does not permit  a reduction  of inflation
in the medium-term,  and even the current  inflation  rate  of about 50% is not sufficient  to prevent
a further increase  of public debt as a share of GDP. In addition, the existence  of backward-
looking nominal  contracts  will impose  a temporary  loss of output due to low capacity utilization,
as the result  of the fill in the real money supply. In addition,  if the program  is not perceived  as
credible,  inflationary  expectations  will not decline  and the real costs in terms of output  foregone
will be substantially  higher and could last longer.
The scenario  of fiscal and monetary coordination  is based on the assumption  that the
announced program is perceived to  be credible, so that the short-term price rigidities are
essentially  due to nominal contracts. The rate of base money growth is set to decline by 20%
per year  for the next six years and is announced  in advance.1J7  Since the central bank has the
intention  to lower reserve  requirements  this allows  larger  monetary  aggregates  (Ml, M2)  to grow
somewhat  faster  than  base money. The  accompanying  fiscal  policy rule is defined  in such  a way
that the stock of net public debt does not increase  over time.  Although this is admittedly a
somewhat  arbitrary  rule that need not be adhered  to at all times, ii is not too restrictive. As long
as population  grows less  than GDP,  for example,  this rule implies  a build-up  in per capita public
debt. Moreover,  in the very long run, the Government  should  aim for a zero  stock of public  debt
in order  to meet  its solvency  condition  as described  above. On the other  hand, this fiscal  policy
rule,  applied in each year,  could lead to a procyclical  policy, since it allows  the public  sector  to
"'  The rate of decline in money growth should be determined  by minimizing  the cost in terms
of output lost.  However,  such a problem cannot be solved  within the framework  of a RMSM-
X model. The  rate  was  selected  by iterating  the model and verifying  the level  of output at the end
of the simulation period. Slower rates of decline do not yield as high an output, while higher
rates cause stronger initial  recessions  and lead to the same result.33
borrow more and, hence, to run larger deficits if the growth rate of the economy is higher. It
turns out that this property of the fiscal policy rule has only modest implications for the
simulations  because  real growth rates  are steady  after  the initial  adjustment  period. Hence,  the
Issue  of whether  the real growth in per capita public debt implied by the fiscal rule is feasible  at
real Interest  rates below the real growth rate of the economy is of a concern.
In the model simulations  fiscal  policy is varied  through changes  in the direct tax rate on
private  sector Income  only. This is for expositionary  simplicity  since the analytical  model does
not address  the distributional  consequences  or second order effects  from different  ways  to cut
the fiscal deficit (except that the  model could show the effects of  reduced government
investment). From the fiscal policy rule it is known how the stock of debt should behave  over
time, and, hence  by modifying  the level  of direct  taxes  trie desired  fiscal deficit  is obtained. The
direct tax rate that satisfies  the fiscal policy rule should not be taken as an estimate  of the
average  direct  tax rate  that Turkey  should  attain. Ouring the disinflationary  program  the tax base
is likely  to change  endogenously,  for example,  as the Tanzi-Oliveira  effect  is reversed,  the real
revenue  from the withholding tax on deposit interest  payments  declines and the real revenue
from corporate  income tax rises as the deductibility  of nominal interest  payments  on corporate
borrowing  erodes  the taxable  income base less. These  endogenous  changes  will automatically
be reflected in the ratio of  direct taxes on private income which should therefore not be
interpreted  as a tax rate.
In the absence  of a fully simultaneous  model, it is necessary  to choose a time path for
at least  one price (or quantity) in order to start  the simulations. In this application,  the domestic
real interest rate was chosen as the starting  variable.  As the fiscal adjustment program is
assumed  to be strong  enough and the program  is perceived  to be credible,  there is little reason
to believe  that real interest  rates  would be very  high. Due  to exiV.ting  nominal rigidities,  however,
it could temporarily  be h.gher  than international  rates. Hence,  it was assumed  in the simulation
that the domestic real bond rate  would rise  from 2% in 1990  to about  5.5%  in 1991  (first  year of
simulations)  or about 2 percentage  points albove  international  rees.
The result of this simulation is presented  in Table 4.2.  Data for  1989  are based on
historical  observations  transformed  in a flow- of-funds  matrix to match the economic  concepts
of the model and could therefore  deviate  from original  sources. Data  for 1990  correspond,  to
the extent possible, with the preliminary estimates,  especially of the fiscal accounts, made
available  during the preparation  of the annual program for 1991. For 1990,  the effects  of the34
Middle East  crisis are taken into account;  it is assumed  that this crisis would be resolved  in the
beginning of 1991  which does not affect  the simulations  except  for the starting  point.
Although  the  coordinated  Figure  4.2: Output  Costs  of Stabilization
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Consequently,  the real  supply  of money  and hence,  of domestic  credit,  falls  by about  6%  in 1991.
This is assumed  to increase  real interest  rates  by about 3.5 percentage  points from the very low
level  of 2% in 1990  to 5.5% in 1991,  somewhat  above international  rates. The upward  pressure
on domestic  interest  rates attracts  foreign  capital  and the real exchange  rate  further  appreciates
by about 3.5% from 1990  to 1991. Higher real interest  rates also increase  domestic nominal
interest  rates  which leads  to a reduction  in demand  for money and velocity rises  from 10.6  in
1990  to 10.8  in 1991. However,  the reduction  in money demand as a result of higher interest
rates is not sufficient  to equilibrate  the money market by itself, and output must adjust for the
market  to clear. Hence,  there is a fall in capacity  utilization  by about 4%  from .99 in 1990  to .95
in 1991. Real  GDP  growth declines  sharply  from the historical  high of 8% in 1990  to almost  zero
in 1991. This primarily  reflects  the cost of adjustment  due to the absence  of perfectly  flexible
prices. It is only to a veryTable  4.2  Tax Scenario:  Key  Indicators
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1996  1999  2000
POLICY NIX
Ease  Noeey  Growth  0.81  0.50  0.40  0.32  0.26  0.20  0.16  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13 Direct  Tax Rate  0.125  0.135  0.166  0.172  0.166  0.173  0.172  0.184  0.181  0.184  0.189  0.189 NATIONAL  ACCOUNTS
Potential  growth  0.043  0.043  0.048  0.048  0.048  0.051  0.054  0.057  0.058  0.059  0.059  0.058 Actual  GDP  Growth  0.010  0.080  0.002  0.00W  0.075  0.071  0.092  0.065  0.071  0.063  0.046  0.048 Capacity  Utilization  0.960  0.994  0.951  0.915  0.938  0.955  0.990  0.997  1.010  1.014  1.001  0.992 Normal  Capacity  Utilization  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 Absorption  Growth  0.053  0.138  0.014  0.006  0.070  0.072  0.095  0.056  0.064  0.054  0.040  0.049 Coapouition  of  GOP:
Resource  Balance  -0.005  -0.042  -0.038  -0.032  -0.033  -0.036  -0.042  -0.039  -038  -0.035  -0.032  -0.033 Consuiption  o.m  0.809  o.e80  0.804  0.803  0.803  0.806  0.804  0.503  0.801  0.799  0.799 Private  0.662  0.668  0.670  0.666  0.664  0.664  0.667  0.664  0.662  0.659  0.657  0.658 Public  0.116  0.141  0.138  0.138  0.139  0.139  0.139  0.140  0.141  0.141  0.142  0.142 Investment  0.227  0.233  0.230  0.228  0.230  0.233  0.236  0.235  0.235  0.235  0.233  0.233 Private  0.127  0.125  0.129  0.127  0.129  0.131  0.134  0.132  0.132  0.130  0.128  0.128 Public  0.101  0.108  0.101  0.101  0.102  0.102  0.102  0.103  0.104  0.104  0.105  0.105 Per  Capita  Consumption  growth  0.057  0.044  0.000  -0.016  0.044  0.047  0.070  0.033  0.041  0.031  0.019  0.027 "OEY  AND PRICES
Real  Average  Exchange Rate  0.950  0.849  0.817  0.811  0.829  0.836  0.848  0.871  0.893  0.918  0.933  0.936 Expected  Real  Exchange  Rate  0.852  0.850  0.843  0.854  0.855  0.851  0.865  0.885  0.905  0.930  0.930  0.930 Real  Domestic  Bond Rate  -0.053  0.020  0.055  0.050  0.040  0.035  0.035  0.035  0.035  0.035  0.035  0.035 Income-Velocity  10.123  10.612  10.678  10.288  10.0O&  9.614  9.251  8.973  8.846  8.813  8.862  8.845  1 Inflation  (e.o.p.)  0.650  0.510  0.428  0.284  0.167  0.094  0.046  0.051  0.063  0.083  0.101  0.090 Inflation  (p.a.)  0.648  0.570  0.468  0.354  0.224  0.130  0.070  0.049  0.057  0.073  0.092  0.095  Li
PUBLIC SECTOR
(share  of GDP)
Nominal  PSBR:  0.070  0.098  0.082  0.072  0.073  0.064  0.058  0.044  0.046  0.047  0.047  0.049 Inflation-Adjusted  PSBR:
Consolidated  Public  Deficit  0.050  0.074  0.038  0.033  0.046  0.044  0.046  0.034  0.036  0.033  0.029  0.030 Budget  Deficit  0.011  0.024  0.002  0.000  0.011  0.007  0.009  -0.001  0.001  -0.002  -0.006  -0.005 SEEs  Deficit  0.017  0.033  0.028  0.029  0.033  0.036  0.039  0.037  0.037  0.037  0.037  0.039 Central  Bank  0.022  0.017  0.008  0.005  0.002  0.000  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.003  -0.003 Financing:
Money  Creation  0.043  0.029  0.023  0.019  0.015  0.013  0.011  0.009  0.009  0.009  0.009  0.008 Met  Domestic  Borrowing  0.040  0.069  0.012  0.014  0.033  0.030  0.028  0.015  0.017  0.016  0.013  0.015 Net  Foreign  Borrowing  -0.033  -0.024  0.003  0.000  -0.002  0.001  0.008  0.010  0.010  0.009  0.007  0.007 Public  Debt  (net)  0.432  0.380  0.380  0.380  0.380  0.380  0.380  0.380  0.380  0.380  0.380  0.380 Total  Domestic  (net)  0.073  0.137  0.149  0.162  0.183  0.202  0.212  0.215  0.217  0.221  0.224  0.229 Non-Financial  0.094  0.139  0.162  0.178  0.195  0.212  0.229  0.239  0.247  0.255  0.260  0.265 Total  External  (net)  0.35L  0.243  0.231  0.218  0.197  0.179  0.168  0.166  0.162  0.160  0.156  0.150 EXTERNAL  SECTOR:
Resource  9b'ance/GWP  -0.005  -0.042  -0.038  -0.032  -0.033  -0.036  -0.042  -0.039  -0.038  -0.035  -0.032  -0.033 CAB/GDP  0.012  -0.023  -0.019  -0.013  -0.015  -0.019  -0.026  -0.025  -0.025  -0.023  -0.020  -0.022 Total  External  Debt/GDP  0.523  0.423  0.412  0.400  0.380  0.360  0.339  0.329  0.318  0.310  0.303  0.295 Total  Net  External  Debt/GDP  0.405  0.319  0.311  0.300  0.281  0.265  0.256  0.256  0.254  0.252  0.250  0.245
Private  External  Debt/GDP  0.087  0.105  0.108  0.108  0.108  0.108  0.108  0.108  0.108  0.108  0.108  0.108 Tovt: Interest/Exports  0.145  0.123  0.128  0.121  0.123  0.122  0.128  0.131  0.132  0.130  0.132  0.134 Stock  of  Reserves  (USS mio)  6178.9  7955.3  8280.9  8855.9  9914.6  10718.9  10366.8  9667.7  9037.6  8671.3  8693.8  8687.336
small extent due to the fiscal contraction  Figure  4.1: Inflation  under  Fiscal  StabIlizatIon.
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and keeping  the ratio  of public  debt to  0%  l
GDP constant. Note  that,  while  the  total  1og0  10*  1904  la0  to"  2000
nominal  PSBR  falls  from  9.8  to 8.2%  of  Nominal  PSOM  Operational  Oeficit
GDP  between  1990  and 1991,  the inflation
adjusted  deficit  falls frcm 7.4 to 3.8%  of GDP (see  Figure  4.3). It is the inflation-adjusted  deficit
that accurately  reflects  the required  fiscal  effort  and not the nominal PSBR  since the size  of the
The deficit  of the SEEs  declines  because  of the anticipated  reduction  in stockbuilding  in 1991
as expressed  In the government's  program. The central bank's deficit declines because  of an
improvement  in its net foreign  exchange  position  as a result  of the increase  in foreign exchange
reserves  and an increase  in the real rediscount  rate.
i'  The increase  in the tax rate does not lead  to a one-for-one  percentage-point  reduction  in the
deficit  because  of the use  of different  denominators.  The  tax rate is expressed  as a ratio  of factor
income of the private  sector  which is less  than GDP,  while  the deficit is expressed  as a share of
GDP.37
latter is influenced  by the composition  of public debt between  domestic and bxternal.i'
As mentioned  above,  the reduction  in  the real  money  supply  and  domestic  credit  available
to the private  sector leads to capital inflows  and an exchange  rate appreciation. As econormic
growth  slows down considerably,  however,  exports  rise  as a share  of GDP  while imports  remain
constant,  leading  to an Improvement  of the resource  balance  as a share  of GDP. This spills  over
in an improvement  of the current  account as a share  of GDP  from a deficit  of 2.3%  in 1990  to a
deficit of 1.9%  in 1991  or US$2.2  billion (see  Figure  4.4: External  Accounts
Figure 4.4).  Together with further external
borrowing  of the private  sector,  this allows  the  4$  ent  of  GOP  1.4
4%
central  bank  to  increase  foreign  exchange  2  1.2
reserves  by about US$300  million.  . . . -..  .
Consistent with  the  observations  on  . . |  . . ..  0.0
nominal contracts in Turkey, price rigidities  -4%  4
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are assumed to disappear within one year
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and there  is no problem  with the credibility  of  - E  R
the program  because  the private  sector  wculd
have observed  an actual  decline in prices backed  by a fiscal adjustment. Hence, in 1992,  end-
of-period  inflation  is lower  than  the growth rate of reserve  money  and real money balances  rise.
Inflation  does not decline enough, however,  to make real balances  rise enough to match the
increase  in real demand  for money,  as a result  of the reduction  in expected  inflation. Therefore,
real interest  rates  stay high and capacity  utilization  needs  to fall further  to equilibrate  the money
market.  If the growth rate of money had not been reduced further or if private agents had
guessed  the change in money growth correctly  and adjusted  real money demand accordingly,
no further reduction  in capacity utilization  would have been necessary. Lower  inflation  would
have  allowed  the private  sector  to replenish  its real  money  balances  to desirable  levels. In 1992,
the further  reduction  in money growth  is still met by nominal rigidities  that prevent  inflation  from
falling enough to equilibrate  the money market.  Hence, a second year of declining  capacity
utilization  follows.  This time it does not lead to a further fall in the actual growth rate since
2'  Under high inflation and with non-indexed debt, a shift to more domestic financing, as
occurred  in 1990,  will widen  the gap between  .he  nominal  PSBR  and the inflation-adjusted  deficit
and will increase  the PSBR  for any given inflation-adjusted  deficit. This is because  the inflation
component of nominal interest payments  is equivaient  to an early retirement  of principal  and
leads  to large current interest  payments  when inflation  is high.38
potential  output continues  to increase  as well. There  is still a moderate  real appreciation  of the
average  real exchange  rate (less  than one percent),  but the expected  real  exchange  rate already
depreciates.  The  further  fiscal reduction  that supports  the monetary  contraction  by 0.5%  of GDP
for the infiation  adjusted deficit, matches almost exactly  the loss in revenue  from the money
creation  (0.4%  of GDP). I he overall  nominal PSBR  declines  further by 1%  of GDP. Direct  taxes
as a share of private  sector income need to be increased  further from 16.6%  in 1991  to 17.2%h
In 1992. The second consecutive  year of low growth agEin  raises  the share of exports in GDP
while  maintaining  imports  constant  as a share  of GDP  and leads  to improvements  of the resource
balance,  the current  account,  and the international  reserve  position  of the central  bank. Total  net
external  debt of the economy (including  central bank reserves)  declines  slightly as a share  of
GDP  to about 30%.
Figure  4.5: Debt  and Reserves
After  the two consecutive  years  of low
growth and a decline of capacity utilization  lato'  GDt  of  _  us$bNno
the economy recovers from the temporary  . '  . - .
losses induced by the price rigidities and  0  . . . . . . r
inflation  starts  to adjust more rapidly  than the  4  ....  ..... ,  ....  ....  ... 
decline  in the rate of money  growth  leading  to
an expansion of the real supply of money.  r0  . . . - 'l  3
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recover  and domestic  interest  rates  to fall. At  m|xetrnWD*bt  ZOffIcatteerve"
the same time the exchange rate starts to
depreciate. Economic  growth recovers  strongly  and reaches  7.5% In 1993. Consequently,  as
economic growth improves the fiscal position there is no need to increase  taxes to offset a
further decline in the revenue  from money creation. In fact, taxes  can even be lowered  and the
inflation  adjusted  deficit  can increase  somewhat,  without leading  to a larger  share of public debt
in GDP. The worsening  of the external  accounts due to higher  growth is partially  offset by the
modest exchange  rate depreciation  and the current  account deficit increases  froml.3 to 1.5%
of GDP.  As Turkey's creditworthiness  is unaffected  or even improved, however, Increased
foreign borrowiny leads to further reserve  accumulation  by the central bank while  the total net
external  debt GDP  ratio declines  to 28% (see  Figure 4.5).
During  most of the remainder  of the decade  capacity  utilization  rates  continue  to improve
leading  to economic  growth rates  in excess  of normal  medium-term  growth  and rapid  Increases39
in real output (Figure 4.6).  From 1993 to  Figure  4.6: Real  GOP
1998, the  economy grows at  an average
*00,
annual  rate  of 7.3%. Thereafter,  the economy  2W  ................  = 
slows down somewhat  but will settle in the  ao  ...
medium  term at growth rates  close  to 6%/  per  t o  .
year.  From 1995 onwards, inflation stays  ,  ........
below 10% per annum, yielding a revenue  t40  . - l'....
from money creation  just below 1%  of GDP.  tgO  ......
In order  to maintain  inflation  W.  this  level,  the  1
nominal PSBR including the  central bank  O  ".  ",,
must fall below  5% of GDP  while  the inflation  TI Trillion. 1988 prIces
adjusted  PSBR  must not be higher  than  3%  of
GDP. The direct tax parameter,  representing  the fiscal policy stance,  has increased  to almost
19%  of value  added of the private  sector. This implies  an increase  in direct  tax revenue  by 40%
in real  terms if the gov  ernment  were to rely  solely on this instrument  to reduce  the fiscal  deficit.
In the medium-term  the 1 scenario of fiscal adjustment  does not cause any problems on the
external accounts. Although initially the current account worsens to about 2.5% of GDP as
economic  growth is sustained  at high levels,  the stock of external  debt as a share  of GDP  does
not increase. Towards  the end of the simulation  period,  the current  account deficit  stabilizes  at
about 2.2% of GDP  and the resource  balance  around  3.3%  of GDP. International  reserves  of the
central bank stabilize  at about US$8.7  billion.
QualificatIons
Higher  real interest  rates. Given  the recursive  nature  of the model, the time path of the
real domestic interest rate, an intermediate  variable imposed on the simulations but usually
solved for simultaneously,  is of crucial importance  for the simulations. With adequate  fiscal
retrenchment  as assumed  in the scenario  presented  above,  the domestic  interest  rate  increases
only because  of the monetary  contraction. It is difficult  to assess  the response  of the interest  rate
to such  a contraction  and even if estimated  demand  equations  had been used, it is not certain
that elasticities  obtained in a period of accommodating  monetary policy with relatively  high
inflation  would continue  to hold under a contractionary  policy.
In order to test the sensitivity  of the model to the real interest  rate, the same scenario,40
hereafter  designated  as 'reference  scenario0,  Figure  4.7: Comparison  of Ex-Ante  Real
is simulated with an interest rate response  Interest  Rates
three times as strong. This implies  for 1991..  |
that  the  ex-ante real  interest rate  would  es.*-..  - .-...|.
increase  to 9.5 % (See  figure 4.7) and return  4" . - ............  .....-.--.--
more slowly to  the  medium-term level of  ..  El-in
3.5%.w  Since  higher  real interest  rates  imply  _, |
that domestic demand  is stronger  for a given  .4-  ... ;.;.;.;..  ...
reduction in real money supply, output is  - _  .992  34  '  1  l
expected  to be higher  initially. The  simulation  inHl,.  nt  9  li0g
results  indeed  show an initially  higher  growth
rate  of 2.7 percent  in 1991  while  the bulk of the adjustment  costs are  taken in 1992  when  output
falls 1.5%  (see  Figure  4.8).
Figure 4.8: Comparison  of GDP  Growth  Figure  4.9  Comparison  of Real  GDP
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Thereafter,  output  recovers  qiuickly  and  subsequent  growth  rates  lead  the  economy  to
reach  the  same  level  of output  as  in  the  reference  simulation  by the  end  of the  period  (see  Figure
4.9). The  time  path  of inflation  is essentially  unmodified  as it is mainly  determined  by the  price
equation  (see  Figure  4.10). Overall,  the difference  with  the  reference  scenario  is rather  small,
implying  comparable  beniavior  of the economy  for  a wide  range  of interest  rate  responses.
D  Ex-post  real interest  rates  will be different  because  the difference  between  expected  and
actual  inflation. Typically,  in disinflationary  programs  ex-post  real  rates  exceed  ex-ante  rates
significantly.  In the reference  scenario,  ex.post  real  rates  are higher  than 10%  in the period
1994-95  while  ex-ante  rates  are  below  5%.41
No contemporaneous  effects  of money on  Figure  4.10: Comparison  of Inflation
prices.  Although the econometrically  estimated
price equation Is statistically  highly significant,  the  70%
presence  of the current  growth rate  of base money  0  u
Is translated immediately Into a change in the  G  - .........................
inflation rate at no output cost.  Admittedly,  the  .........
weight  of this va.I  able  is only 23% so that  the effect  E
of price rigidities  still dominates. In order to test  0-  _ 
the  robustness of  the  results the  coontempo-
oraneous money supply was set equal to zero.
Consequently,  current  inflation  becomes  a
function  of past Inflation,  the parameter  on change  Figure  4.11: Comparison  of  GOP  Growth
in the nominal  exchange  rate and the deviation  of
capacity utilization from its  normal level.  This
modification  leads .o a stronger  initial  recession  in  ..  l  - ..  - -
1991 but allows the economy to recover quickly  4.  ..  . .
thereafter  (see Figure 4.11). The path of inflation  2%  . ...  ..
is essentially  the same reflecting  the dominance
of  all  other variables  in the  price equation  (see  ..
o  12n  es  n^  Su  200
Figure 4.12).  Since the  initial fall in  capacity  withO  a  l  .
utilization  is somewhat  stronger,  inflation  falls
faster in the period 1993-95,  as private  agents are  Figure  4.12: Comparison  of Inflationt
more willing to adjust their prices. By the end of
the  projection period there are  no  significant  so  ...............  |.|
differences  between  the simulations  and the level |  . I...................................  .....  . ...  - ..
of real  output  is almost  identical  (Figure  4.13).  4o  41  .--------.-.--  -----  . l
Given  these  results,  the  exlusion  of  . |.  . |.  ..  |
contemporaneous  money growth shifts the  10,
recession  towards the beginning  of the period as  |  ,l  E  E  E  EI E000
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agents  need  more  time  to adjust  their  expectations |  cW,t.  .h
but leaves  all otUer  conclusions  unaltered.
Slower monetary contraction. As the adjustment  costs in the reference  scenario are
substantial  one might consider  a slower  monetary contraction. A reduction  in the growth rate42
of base  money  by 10%  per year instead  of  Figure  4.13:  Comparison  of Real  GDP
20%  per year  not surprisingly  lengthens  the  tI  TmrUnLon  oltioe
adjustment  process  while  alleviating  its  impact
in  the  earlier  years.  Growth  declines  from  8%
in  1990 to  2.9% both In  1991 and  1992
instead  of  0.2%  and  0.9%,  respectively.  .0  . |.  - .I
However,  Inflation  never  declines  below  12%  t20  a.......l
throughout  the entire  simulation  period  (see  ooa
sto tn92  t"4  t"  UN  gm.....
Figure  4.14).
As a consequence  of the continuing
decline  in money  growth  the economy  does  Figure  4.14: Comparlson  of Inflation
not recover  as  much as in the previous
scenario. The average  growth  rate for the  O's  Htadmts
period  1993-2000  Is only  5.1%  compared  soll  ~~~~~~0%  X  ........  ................................-.............................................. period  1993-2000  is only 5.1%  compared  i 
to  6.6% in  the scenario  with the faster  '"
adjustment.  Hence,  although  initial  hardship  30%  .. i.  ..
is less  severe  with  faster  money  growth,  total  20%  .......
output  in  the  economy  is 7.5%  smaller  by  the  io4  . ..
end  of the  simulation  period  (see  Figure  4.15).  0o  l  12  la  t  ,,  li
Most other indicators  are not significantly !_10m . 0ntreatbln 3
affected  by the  slower  reduction  of mon
etary growth.  The time  profile of  the  Figure  4.15:  Comparison  of Real  GDP  Growth
reduction  in the fiscal  deficit  is tilted  into  the
future  since  initially  more  revenue  from  money | 
creation  Is  obtained. However,  by the end of  S  8....  ..  ...............................  ........................  ..-.---.-...
the  simulation  period  the  direct  tax rate  as a  %  ......  ...  E.  ..
share  of private  factor income  is the same  4%  . |  ..............
across both  alternatives.  The  welfare
implications  of  the  alternative  scenarios | 
depend  crucially  on the relative  weights  of  |'  t  a  ie4  . UK  8000
inflatlon  and  output and on  the private |10  .e,rm.u  iano  .
discount  factor  in Turkey's  welfare  function.
If the weight  on output  is large or if the discount  factor is high,  the alternative  of a slower43
reduction In money growth maybe welfare improving.  Nevertheless,  at any discount factor
smaller  than  infinity  the faster  reduction  of money  growth would  be preferable  from 1995  onwards
because  per capita output Is higher, and probably even before that if inflation has a positive
weight since it Is substantially  higher  than In the reference  scenario  from 1993  onwards. From
the political  perspective,  given  the 1992  elections,  the slower  monetary  contraction  may improve
re-electlon  chances  for the Government. This proposition  is, however,  doubfful as in any case
growth rates will have been drastically  decreased  while little progress  will have been made on
the Inflatlon  front.  If Inflatlon Is a more Important  Issue,  the scenario  with the faster slowdown
In money creation  is clearly  preferable.
Although the scenario of fiscal stabilization is economically feasible, based on the
econometric  estimates,  the required  fiscal adjustment  is substantial  and the temporary  output
costs are significant. The scenario  Implies  two years of harsh  adjustment,  during one of which
consumption per capita actually  declines. The adjustment  comes at a difficult  moment  for the
present Government  in the light of the 1992  elections. Hence,  possible  slippage in the area of
economic  management  is to be expected  primarily  from the fiscal side. An alternative  scenario
could arise from the unwillingness  of the government  to adjust the fiscal deficit based on the
perception  that it would lead to a fall in growth while  at the same  time the monetary  authorities
continue to  reduce the rate of growth of money supply.  It may become clear during the
implementation  of such a policy package,  however,  that the monetary contraction  has severe
negative  output effects  because  of the credit  squeeze  that it provokes. A relaxation  of monetary
policy inspired by the desire to maximize  output growth in the short-run would be a second
alternative.
4.4. MONETARY  CONTRACTION  WITHOUT  FISCAL  ADJUSTMENT
While coordination between  fiscal and monetary policy is crucial for the permanent
success  of a disinflationary  program, the Turkish  central bank has independently  reduced  the
rate of monetary expansion in 1990. By provoking a credit squeeze  and a rise In domestic
interest  rates  It hoped  to coerce  the non-financial  public sector  to reduce  the fiscal  deficit. In thie
mean time, the public sector received  less revenue  from money  creation, and,  therefore,  had to
borrow more.  A monetary contraction  not sustained  by a fiscal contraction is akin to a fiscal
expansion.  Private  economic agents are no longer taxed as much on their current money
holdings. Nevertheless,  due to the price rigidities,  the monetary  contraction  still has short-run44
adjustment  costs.
For  the  sake  of  exposition, it  is  Figure  4.16  Monetary  contraction
assumed in this scenario  that private  agents  Ex*ont ra  interet rat*
perceive it  as  sustainable and  that  both
foreign  creditors  as  well  as  domestic  a.
economic agents are willing to  absorb an  as
increasingly  larger amount of public bonds.  ,*  ........
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10o  19"  ON  2Ws  SO hypothetical  situation  economic  agents  do not
have  adverse  inflationary  expectations  and do
not charge  a risk premium  on Government  PAW  exchange  rate
bonds. Consequently,  domestic real interest
rates are high but are not increasing  as the
ratio of public debt to GDP rises. As it turns  1*.....
out,  this  scenario  becomes  quickly
unsustainable,  which indicates  that this policy
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years. The same rate of reduction  in money  . . .
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Monetary  oontmtl  R  e
i.e.,  a  decline  by  20%  per  year,  is
implemented while fiscal policy is kept the
same  as in 1990  throughout  the simulation  period,  except  for a reduction  in public  stockbuilding
which  was  extra-ordinarily  high in 1990. As a result  of the assumption  about  the credibility  of this
scenario, inflation follows a very similar time path as in the scenario of fiscal stabilization.
However,  the model generates  whatever  public debt will be given by the constant  fiscal stance.
The transition path of the economy is still marked by price rigidities that lead to short-run
adjustment  costs (see Table 4.3).  The relative  fiscal expansion  does not offset much of this
rigidity, and output growth declines  to 0.6%  and 0.9%  in 1991-92,  as opposed to 0.2% and 1%
in the fiscal stabilization  scenario. Domestic  real interest  rates are csjnificantly  higher  and the
real  exchange rate appreciates more than in the  previous scenario (see Figure 4.16).
Consequently,  both fiscal and external  accounts  deteriorate  significantly. Even  with fallingToble 4.3  Borrowing Scenario: Key Indicators
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
POLICY NtX
Base  Money  Growth  0.81  0.50  0.40  0.32  0.26  0.20  0.16  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13 Direct  Tax  Rate  0.125  0.135  0.135  0.135  0.135  0.135  0.135  0.135  0.135  0.135  0.135  0.135 NATIONAL  ACCOUNTS
Potentfal  growth  0.043  0.043  0.048  0.048  0.049  0.053  0.055  0.058  0.059  0.061  0.062  0.061 Actual  GDP  Growth  0.010  0.080  0.006  0.010  0.084  0.069  0.080  0.073  0.079  0.066  0.049  0.050 Capacity  Utilization  0.960  0.994  0.954  0.919  0.950  0.964  0.986  1.001  1.019  1.024  1.012  1.001 Norml Capccity  Utilization  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 Absorption  Growth  0.053  0.138  0.026  0.019  0.084  0.072  0.089  0.079  0.085  0.069  0.050  0.050 Composition of  GDP:
Resource  alaence  -0.005  -O.P41  -0.042  -0.043  -0.047  -0.050  -0.058  -0.064  -0.070  -0.074  -0.075  -0.075 Consumption  0.777  0.809  0.812  0.813  0.815  0.817  0.821  0.824  0.827  O.9  0.830  0.830 Private  0.662  0.668  0.674  0.676  0.678  0.680  0.684  0.687  0.690  0.692  0.693  0.693 Pubtlc  0.116  0.141  0.138  0.137  0.137  0.137  0.137  0.137  0.137  0.137  0.137  0.137 Investment  0.227  0.233  0.231  0.230  0.232  0.233  0.237  0.240  0.243  0.245  0.245  0.246 Private  0.127  0.125  0.130  0.131  0.132  0.133  0.137  0.139  0.142  0.145  0.144  0.145 Ptulic  0.101  0.108  0.101  0.100  0.100  0.103  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.101  0.101 Per Capita  Corsumption growth  0.057  0.044  0.013  -0.001  0.061  0.048  0.065  0.056  0.061  0.046  0.030  0.028 NOEY  AND  PRICES
Real Average  Exchange  Rate  0.950  0.849  0.805  0.785  0.796  0.800  0.800  0.801  0.803  0.805  0.807  0.810 Expected Real Exchange  Rate  0.E52  0.850  0.843  0.84  0.84  0.840  0.837  0.835  0.835  0.835  0.835  0.835 Real Domestic Bond  Rate  0.053  0.020  0.085  0.080  0.070  0.070  0.070  0.070  0.070  0.070  0.070  0.070 Incme-Velocity  10.12O  10.612  10.718  10.263  10.086  9.652  9.283  9.016  8.849  8.767  8.774  8.861 Inflation  (e.o.p.)  0.650  0.510  0.428  0.275  0.160  0.100  0.057  0.044  0.051  0.074  0.092  0.091  4- Inflation  (p.a.)  0.648  0.570  0.468  0.349  0.216  0.129  0.078  0.051  0.048  0.063  0.083  0.091
PUBLIC  SECTOR
(share  of  GOP)
Nominst  PSBR:  0.070  0.098  0.111  0.115  0.117  0.119  0.116  0.112  0.113  0.118  0.126  0.136 Inflation  Adjusted PSBR:
Consolidated  Public Deficit  0.050  0.073  0.068  0.070  0.082  0.092  0.096  0.097  0.098  0.097  0.097  0.105 Budget Deficit  0.011  0.025  0.030  0.035  0.044  0.052  0.055  0.056  0.055  0.054  0.052  0.055 SEEs  Deficit  0.017  0.033  0.029  0.030  0.035  0.040  0.042  0.042  0.043  0.043  0.043  0.046 Central  Bank  0.022  0.016  0.008  0.005  0.002  0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.004 Financing:
Money  Creation  0.043  0.029  0.023  0.019  0.015  0.013  0.011  0.009  0.009  0.009  0.009  0.009 met  Domstic  Borrowing  0.040  0.069  0.039  0.041  0.054  0.061  0.058  0.052  0.043  0.034  0.027  0.029 Net foreign  Borrowing  -0.033  -0.024  0.006  0.010  0.013  0.018  0.027  0.036  0.046  0.054  0.061  0.067 Pubtic  Debt (net)  0.432  0.380  0.405  0.437  0.464  0.506  0.546  0.589  0.626  0.666  0.713  0.763 Total  Domestic (net)  0.073  0.137  0.175  0.215  0.252  0.297  0.333  0.362  0.379  0.390  0.399  0.410 Non-Finaneial  0.094  0.139  0.190  0.240  0.286  0.343  0.399  0.454  0.503  0.552  0.603  0.657 Total  External  Cnet)  0.358  0.243  0.230  0.223  0.212  0.209  0.213  0.226  0.247  0.276  0.313  0.353 EXTERNAL  SECTOR:
Resource  atlance/GP  -0005  -0.041  -0.042  -0.043  -0.047  -0.050  -0.058  -0.064  -0.070  -0.074  -0.075  -0.075 CA11/GDP  0.012  -0.022  -0.024  -0.025  -0.030  -0.036  -0.046  -0.054  -0.063  -0.070  -0.076  -0.081 Total  External  Debt/GOP  0.523  0.423  0.407  0.390  0.366  0.347  0.326  0.309  0.294  0.282  0.273  0.266 Total  Net  External  Debt/GDP  0.405  0.318  0.311  0.305  0.298  0.297  0.303  0.318  0.340  0.371  0.410  0.450 Private  External  Debt/GDP  0.087  0.105  0.108  0.108  0.108  0.108  0.108  0.108  0.108  0.108  0.108  0.108 Total  Interest/Exports  0.145  0.123  0.128  0.123  0.125  0.126  0.131  0.135  0.138  0.138  0.143  0.145 Stock  of  Reserves (USS  mio)  6178.9  7984.3  7940.7  7302.0  6341.3  4495.4  933.7  -4837.7 -13332.0 -24841.4 -39282.7  S6764.246
inflation,  the nominal PSBR  increases  from  Figure  4.17: Nominal  PSBR
9.8%  in 1990  to 11.1%  In 1991  and edges up
further  to more  than 13%  by 2000 (see  Figure  *et  G If GM
4.17). Mainly  as a result  of the increasing  *  . . ...................................
stock of  public debt, the inflation-adjusted  l% - . |  |  |  | . . l-  ..
deficit also increases  to more than 10% of  . ...  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ....
GDP,  a  deterioration  of  more  than  7  . ..  ..  ....  ...
percentage  points of GDP,  compared to the  ,E
reference  scenario  (see Figure 4.18). This is  o'  ,  v.
also reflected  in a rapidly  rising stock of  gm.cortI@n  l  It.rgao
public debt as a share of  GDP. Total net
public debt rises  from 38% to 40.5%  of GDP  between  1990  and 1991  and continues  to increase
by about 4 percentage  points of GDP per year to reach more than 76% by the end of the
simulation  period (see  Figure  4.19). As long as the weighted  average  real interest  rate  on public
debt exceeds  the real  growth  rate  of the economy  and the primary  deficit  minus the revenue  from
money creation is positive,  this ratio  will continue  to increase.
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The evolution of the external  accounts mirrors the domestic effects of the monetary
contraction  without  fiscal  adjustment.  The  real  appreciation  initially  worsens  the resource  balance
only moderately,  since growth falls. Starting  in 1993,  however,  the real exchange  rate stabilizes
and growth resumes,  worsening the resource balance significantly (see Figure 4.20).  The
resource  gap stabilizes  at around  7.5%  of GNP,  and the current  account deficit reaches  similar
levels. Contrary  to the fiscal  stabilization  scenario,  the current  account deficit is not lower  than47
the  resource balance, because of  interest  FigUr 4.20: External  Accounts
payments due  on  an  Increasing stock  of°t  * 
external debts.  At  the  current level of
International  reserves,  the  current  account
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Although  the  simulations  are
technically  feasible,  the ever-increasing  stock of net domestic  and foreign public debt increases
the likelihood  that the real interest  rate  will exceed  the real  growth rate of the economy. Hence,
the recently  initiated  attempt  to disinflate  by monetary  policy alone has put the economy  on an
unfeasible  medium-term  path. As long as private  agents believe  that the Government  will run
future surpluses  the economy can remain on this path.  Given  Turkey's history of using the
inflation  tax to finance mushrooming  fiscal  deficits, however,  the private sector will most likely
anticipate  the return  of the inflation  tax. At some point, a further monetary  contraction  will no
longer  be perceived  as sustainable  and private  agents  will revise  their inflationary  expectations
upward, resulting in a  much stronger credit contraction for  any given monetary policy.
Alternatively,  they may demand  a risk premium  on Government  bonds.  Initially,  the exchange
rate might still appreciate  as further external  borrowing  is attempted,  but given  the likely loss of
output due to this contraction,  any foreign borrowing  raises external  debt/GDP ratios  and the
loss of  credibility will spill over to  international  credit markets leading to  a foreign credit
constraint. Some of these expected developments  materialized  in the first quarter of 1991;
private agents expect  inflation  to be higher  by 10-15%  in 1991,  short-term  ex-ante  real interest
rates  on Treasury  bills have risen above  the growth rate of the economy  and the real exchange
rate has started  to depreciate.
The simulation of a scenario  with a shift in expectations  or a worsening of credibility
cannot  be done without  modifying  the underlying  behavioral  equations  of the model. This  poses
the crucial problem of the timing of the shift In the behavior  of the private sector. This issue
a  A negative  stock of reserves  simply implies  that the Central  Bank can borrow sufficiently  to
sell the foreign exchange  in the domestic  market  in order to finance  the current  account deficit.48
cannot be addressed  ;ithin the analytical  framework developed  above, in part because the
dynamics  of such developments  are better  expressed  in terms of months  or weeks tather  than
years. Nevertheless,  embarking on a path as described  In Table 4.3 increases  the probability
of a dramatic  shift in the private  sector's behavior  which  will almost certainly  lead  to larger  costs
than those involved in the fiscal stabilization  scenario.  Knowing this, the Government  may
choose  to forego the short-run  costs and avoid  the unsustainable  debt dynamics  by continuing
to rely  on the inflation  tax instead  of making a reduction  of inflation  one of its primary  objectives.
Unfortunately,  this is what appears  to be happening  in the first quarter of 1991  as the central
bank has  abandoned  Its restrictive  monetary  program  and tripled its advances  to the Treasury.
5.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
This paper  has  shown  how the standard  RMSM-X  model can  be transformed  Into  a model
useful  to analyze  short-term  behavior  of the economy. The incorporation  of an estimated  price-
equation  and the solution of the money market  for capacity  utilization  yields a short-run  Phillips
curve. Deviations  of capacity  utilization  from its normal  level  will lead  to price adjustments  in the
following  period, giving the model a stable behavior  over time.  If actual and expected  inflation
are equal,  the model will exhibit  full employment  and remain  in that steady  state. Admittedly,  the
recursive  nature of the model imposes a somewhat  peculiar use of lagged variables  and the
closure  of markets  through  quantities. To the extent  that the lagged  responses  can be motivated
by theory or econometric  estimation  this does not pose a problem.  The quantity closure of
markets  requires  some ex-post  checking  of the behavior  of the variables  that close the markets
and necessitates  a sensitivity  analysis of the solution to the specified time path of the key
intermediate  variable,  in this case,  the real domestic interest  rate.
Turning  to the problem  of inflation  stabilization  in Turkey,  the scenarios  make  clear that
a sizeable  up-front  fiscal  adjustment  is necessary  to embark on a credible disinflation  program.
They  also reveal  that the 1990  situation  of contractionary  monetary  policy and fiscal  expansion
cannot continue  and that, in the absence  of fiscal  adjustment,  a return  to the use of the inflation
tax Is unavoidable. In any case, with or without fiscal adjustment,  a monetary  contraction  will
have sizeable  costs in terms of lost output. During  the initial  years  of the stabilization  program,
output growth is likely to slow to almost zero. However,  once this cost is incurred,  per car .a
income  will recover quickly and medium-term  growth rates of around  5% per year  are feasible.
Delaying  the adjustment  will most likely increase  its costs and raises the risk of accelerating49
Inflation due to the likely shift in private agents' expectations  as the credibility of economic
policies  declines.50
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